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172 Labour, European Integration and the Post-Imperial Mind 
Beyond Empire? 
The European debate functioned as a forum in which Labour fought over 
Its political Identity and purpose. In the 1960s and 1970s it ·1t d rheto· I aff · f · 'perm.re a 
. nca re 'lnnatwn o the commitment to "anti-imperialism" as botl 
Sides fought t? harness it to their respective causes. The same applied t~ 
Germanophobm and anti-Americanism, as well as to Labour' 8 commitment 
to some eventual form of "world government" roo At d 1 1 h th d b · a eeper eve , 
owever, e e ate ahout EC membership also showed how attitudes 
whrch had earlier rendered Labour ambivalent about disbanding the 
emprre shaped t~e party's responses to European integration. In particular, 
Bntam contmuea to be exalted as uniquely able to contribute to the sum of 
w?~ld h~ony, thro~gh both economic development and superpower detent~. There was,_ or course, a senous cf..Jvide between those who argued 
~at thrs was most likely to be achieved through the Commonwealth: the 
s~..-wn of emprre- or the European Community. Beyond this however the 
deb:~: a~out _Europe 
1 
f?rced _the main protagonists to co~pete fo;· the 
alleoianc..., of thos~ ho1d1~g ~UI~ homogeneous views of Britain's place in 
the. world ~d their party-s rore1gn policy aims. By doing so, it confirmed 
therr centrality to Labour's political sense of self. 
100 C h- "L 
onon, abour and European Integration", chap. 3. 
"A COMPLEX QUESTION 
ABOUT THE REMNANTS OF EMPIRE": 1 
THE LABOUR PARTY 
ANDTHEFALKLANDSVVAR 2 
DAVID STEWART 
The Falklands War of 1982 was the last military conflict to be fought 
independently by Britain. Although it occurred in a post-colonial era in 
which the United Kingdom had ceased to be a "Great Power", the 
prominence of imperial imagery was a feature of the conflict. 3 It was 
presented by the media and the Conservative Party as atonement for the 
humiliation of the 1956 Suez Crisis, signalling the reversal of Britain's 
perceived decline. The war also represented a mrning point in the Thatcher 
era, acting as a launch pad for a generation of Conservative Party 
hegemony. Debate, led by Max Hastings, Simon Jenkins, Richard 
Thornton, Hugo Bicheno and Lawrence Freedman, has tended to focus on 
the diplomatic and political origins of the conflict and the conduct of the 
military campaign.4 Social scientists, such as Paul Whiteley, Harold 
Clarke, William Mishler, David Sanders, Hugh Ward, and David Marsh 
have concentrated on the conflict's role in reinvigorating Margaret 
Thatcher's prerniership.5 
1 Tony Benn, The End of an Era: Diaries 1980-90 (London: Arrow, 1994), 202. 
2 I would like to thank Stephen Meredith, Billy Frank and Craig Horner for their 
comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. 
3 Jolm M. MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British 
Public Opinion, 1880-!960 {Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 
258. 
4 Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (London: Pan, 
1983). 
5 Harold Clarke, William Mishler and Paul ¥/hiteley, "Recapturing the Falklands: 
Models of Conservative Populariry, 1979-83", in British Journal of Polirical 
Science 20, no. 1 (1990), 63-81 ~David Sanders, Hugh Ward and David Marsh, 
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Yet despite Stephen Howe's contention that the Falklands conflict 
"prompted a host of [centre-left] historians to start thinking about. .. 
patriotism and national identity in Britain",6 the Labour Party's responses 
to the war have largely been overlooked. No in-depth study of Labour 
Party strategy has been published, leaving interested scholars dependent 
on the highly partisan memoirs, diaries and biographies of leading Labour 
Party protagonists, and Anthony Barnett and Clive Christie's brief 
contemporary accounts of the British left and the Falklands War7 Although 
labour_ historians and social scientists' preoccupation with internal Labour 
Party factionalism and domestic policymaking dnring the 1980s is 
understandable, an examination of the party's response to this pivotal 
event in the Thatcher era is long overdue. The conflict posed a stem 
challenge to the Labour Party's often inchoate anti-imperialist, democratic 
socialist and pacifist traditions. Indeed, the party leader Michael Foot, and 
his foremost left-wing opponent Tony Benn embodied this dilemma. 
This chapter seeks to place the Labour Party's responses to the 
Falklands War in the context of the party's historic anti-imperialism and 
post-war foreign policy. The positions of the party leadership, backbench 
MPs, Constituency Labour Parties (CLPs), and trade unions are 
considered, revealing the extent to which Labour's handling of the 
Falklands crisis was shaped by left/right divisions and factional alliances. 
The contrasting personalities of Foot and Benn underpin the chapter. 
Emphasizing the importance of media coverage in influencing popular 
attitudes towards the conflict, it also scrutinizes the Falklands campaign's 
impact on Labour's electoral fortunes. The chapter begins by outlining the 
nature of the British-Argentine dispute over the Falkland Islands. 
Labour and Empire: Labour Party Foreign Policy 
and the Origins ofthe Falklands Conflict, 1945-75 
Argentina's claim to the Malvinas, which were situated 8,000 miles !rom 
the United Kingdom in the South Atlantic, stemmed from its sporadic 
occupations of the Islands in the period 1820-9, when Spanish imperial 
"Government Popularity and the Falklands War", British Journal of Political 
Science 17, no. 2 (1987). 281-313. 
6 
Stephen Howe, "Internal Decolonizarion? British Politics since Thatcher as Post-
folonial Trauma'', Tw'entieth-.Cent~ry l}ritish Histo?' 14, no. 3 (2003), 293-4-. 
Anthony Barnett, Iron Bntanma (London: Alhson and Busby, 1983); Clive 
Christie, ''The British Left and the Falklands War", Political Quarterly 55, no. 3 (1984), 288-307. 
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power was dissolving in South America8 The Falkland Islands officially 
became a British colonv in 1833, acting as a fuelling station for the Royal 
Navy. Its small popuiation primarily consisted of Scottish and Welsh 
sheep farmers shipped there by the British government to provrde a 
permanent presence. From 1875 the Falklands was controlled by the 
Falkland Islands Company, which owned two-thirds of the farms on tne 
Islands. In 1880, Argentina requested the return of the Falklands, 
establishing a diplomatic pattern in which its claim was raised at thirt~­
vear intervals? During this period, Argentina became a British econonnc 
;nd commercial depe;dency, attracting a sizeable British settler population. 
Following Argenti~na' s assertion of sovereignty over South Georgia in 
1927, however, British-Argentincan relations gradually deteriorated, and 
durino World War Two Argentinean support for the Axis powers led Britai~ to send trooos to protect the Falklands. 
After 1945 the decline of the British Empire combined with the rise of 
Peronism to h~ighten Argentine interest in the Islands. 10 Peronism, wh~ch 
united trade union and industrial interests behind the cause of Argentine 
economic modernization, took its name from the Argentine President, 
General Juan Peron, who propounded a xenophobic form of "integral 
nationalism". Bv harnessing nationalist sentiment over the Malvinas, 
Peron added to his popular appeal and diverted attention from Argenti~a' s 
staonating economy. Despite Peron's exile in 1955, the Malvinas remamed 
a t~ontli;e issue in Argentine politics, and in 1965, the United Nations 
((JN) recognized Argentina's right to negotiate with Britain over sovereignt):· 
The 1964-70 Labour government was unprepared for tt>~s 
development. The Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, was drawing from a 
shallow pool of distinctive Labour Party foreign policy ideas. Lab~ur' s 
belief in its historic anti-imperialism, based upon the party's percetved 
opposition to milita,_-rism, nationalism, racism, and dictatorships, . was 
central to the Labour Party's self-image. However, post-war Laoour 
foreign policy had been shaped by pragmatic internationalism, placing 
particular emphasis on collective security, and the upholding of democracy 
and human rights. Rhiannon Vickers asserts that these sentiments owed 
8 Hastings and Jenkins, Battle for the Falklands, 6--7. 
9 Lawrence Freedman, Britain and the Falklands War (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), 
19-25. 
10 J. C. J. Metford, ''Falklands or Malvinas? The Background to the Dispute", 
International Affairs 44. no. 3 (1968). 463. 
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more to radical nineteenth-century liberalism than socialism. ll Despite 
notable decolonizations in India and Palestine, the Attlee governments 
favoured colonial development over self-determination. Labour• s preference 
for a paternalistic commonwealth was bullt upon the imperialist 
assumption of a British global role. The party adopted an Atlanticist stance 
in the cold war, and sanctioned a British nuclear weapons programme. 
Labour was aiso a founder of the UN in 1947 and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization in 194912 This set the framework for a loose political 
consensus on foreign policy, embracing collective security, Atlanticism 
and a nuclear deterrent, intended to maintain Britain's "'Great Power" 
status. 
Although the Labour Party leadership's pragmatism provided British 
foreign policy continuity, reassuring the electorate of Labour's patriotism, 13 
it undennined the pursuit of socialism by diverting public expenditure 
away from the welfare state and nationalized industries, thereby inhibiting 
redistribution. The imperialist financial underpinnings of the party's 
opponents in the City of London were overlooked. Even left-wing 
opponents of the consensus, such as Foot, who had forged his political and 
journalistic reputation through the condemnation of appeasement in Guilty 
Men, 14 operated on the premise that Britain was a "Great Power", wielding 
international influence that should be used to prornore democratic 
socialism and nuclear disannament. Foot's vision blended "regretful but 
firm anti-communism" with unwavering commitment to parliament, the 
Commonwealth and the UN. 15 Consequently, a coherent socialist post-
imperial foreign policy failed to emerge. Instead, Labour d:iiferentiated 
itself from the Conservatives by denouncing doctrines of racial superiority, 
affirming the brotherhood of man, and advocating redistribution of wealth 
from the richer to poorer countries. 16 
11 
Rhiannon Vickers, The Labour Parry and the World, vol. 1: The Evolution of 
Labour's Foreign Policy 1900-51 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2004), 192-3. 
12 
Kenneth 0. Morgan, Labour in Power, 1945-1951 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1984), 238-9, 279-84. 
13 
Stephen Howe, "Labour Patriotism, 1939-83", in Raphael SamueL ed., 
Patriotism: The Making and Unmaking of British National Identity, vol. 1: History 
and Politics (London, Routledge, 1989), 132-3. 
14 
Michael Foot (with Peter Howard and Frank Owen), Guilty Men (London: 
Gollancz, 1940). 
15 
Kenneth 0. Morgan, Michael Foot: A Life (London: Harper Collins, 2007), 125. 
16 
John Callaghan, The Labour Party and Foreign Policy: A History, (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2007), 193-4. 
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The Suez Crisis acted as a watershed, altering the nature of the 
consensus. After a period of prevarication, the Labour Party leader, Hug1~ Gaitskell, opposed British military action, callmg for a UN settlement 
Suez exposed Britain's financial reliance on America, undermmmg Its 
claim to "Great Power" status. Thereafter, decolonization became integral 
to the foreign policy consensus. Assumptions of British "Greatness" were 
gradually eroded, as foreign policy focused on managing the retreat. from 
Empire, and locating a new world role. The Wilson govern~ents b1d f~r 
European Economic Community (EEC) membership, refused to commit 
troops in the Vietnam War, and established the Department for Overs,eas 
Development (DFOD), which provided financ1al assistance to New 
Commonwealth and third-world countries. As C.M.M. Cotton demonstrates, 
rhetorical anti-imperialism remained central to the Labour Party's moral 
self-image, and the DFOD won widespread acclaim from party members 
anxious to atone for Britain's imperial past. Wilson also tmtlated nuhtary 
withdrawal from east of Suez, reducing Britain's cold war commitments. 
The failure to implement commonwealth sanctions against the .~parth~id 
regime in South Africa and the gov~rnment~s impotence rollowmg 
Southern Rhodesia's unilateral declaratwn of mdependence, however, 
were condemned by a cross-section of the Labour Party. John Young 
concludes that although Wilson <created a sustainable policy', he did so 
'more by muddle and a collapse of alternatives than any long-term 
vision' 18 Wh~n the Falklands issue arose in ! 965 it was deemed of peripheral 
significance. 19 Labour highlighted the rights of the 1,800 islanders, whc:_ 
wished to remain British, while initiating a gradual process 01 
disengagement. \Vilson's Conservative successor, . E~ward .Hea~h, 
encouraged Argentina to improve transport commun.I~atwns With ~ne 
Falklands in the hope of eroding the Islanders' oppos1l10n to Argentme 
control. During 1974 the new Labour foreign secretary, Jim Callaghan, 
discussed loint British-Argentinean development of the Falklands' oil 
reserves?0 -The nrevious year, British entry to the EEC raised the prospect 
of a new post-i~perial role as the bridge between Europe and America: ~t 
the 1975 EEC Referendum, however, left-wing opponents of membership, 
such as Foot, MP for Ebbw Vale, and Benn, MP for Bristol South East, 
i7 Philip M. Wiliiams, Hugh Gaitskell (Oxford: Jonathan Cape, 1982), 278-92: 
18 John W. Young, The Labour Governmenrs !964-1970, voL 2: lnternatwnal 
Policy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 226. 
19 lbid, 12-13. 
2° Kenneth 0. Morgan, Callaghan: A Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997), 461-2. 
w-
I 
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condemned the prospect of abandoning the Commonwealth for a "rich 
man's club"?1 Benn had been moving rapidly leftwards since 1970 and his 
1V1arxist-influenced views differed significantly from Foot's 'undoctrinaire 
ethical socialism'. Benn laid claim to the mantle of anti-imperialism by 
associating British entry to the EEC with an establishment project to 
"transform the troublesome natives of Britain .. .into the subjects of a new 
imperialism".22 Arguing that Britain had become the "last ·colony in the 
British Empire" through the surrender of sovereignty to America, the EEC 
and multinational companies, Benn called for the Labour movement to 
lead a "national liberation struggle".23 The Labour Party was split, 
precipitating bitter internal divisions and jeopardizing the foreign policy 
consensus. 
End of Consensus: The Path to War, 1976-82 
In the midst of this uncertainty, the Falklands issue became increasingly 
volatile. In 1976, a quasi~ fascist military junta seized power in Argentina, 
executing :Marxist opponents and arresting socialists and trade unionists?4 
That year the former Labour leader of the House of Lords, Lord 
Shackleton, published a report recommending £13 million of investment in 
the Falkland Islands' infrastructure to facilitate economic expansion and 
greater independence from Britain.25 Coincidino with the :international 
Monetary Filnd crisis and substantial reduction~ in oublic expenditure 
Shackleton's proposals were rejected by the Labour go~ernment.A ' 
Meanwhile, an Argentine bid ro purchase the Falkland Islands 
Company was blocked, and the British ambassador was withdrawn from 
Buenos Aires after the Argentine navy fired on a British Antarctic survev 
ship. VVhen British intelligence uncovered Argentine plans to invade th~ 
Islands in 1977, the prime minister, Callaghan, sent a nuclear submarine 
and two frigates to the South Atlantic to warn off the Junta.26 Callaghan's 
actions were welcomed by the Labour Party, which supported the British 
Argentina Support Campaign, pressing for a ban on arms sales to the 
21 Morgan, Michael Foot, 274. 
~~Tony Benn, Arguments for Socialism (London: Jonathan Cape, 1979), 164. 
2~ T~n~ Benn, Argwnents for Democracy (London: Jonathan Cape, 1981), 3~ 17. 
Rtchard Thomton, The Falklands Sting: Reagan, Thatcher, and Argentina's 
Bomb (Washingron DC: Brassey's, 1988), 4-19. 
25 
Hastings and Jenkins. Battle;~or the Falklands 28-30. 26 , 
Morgan, Callaghan, 594. 
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Junta, and a policy of providing refuge to Argentine political prisoners?7 
The trade unions, which formed the organizational and financial hub of the 
Campaign, demanded that diplomatic pressure be exerted on Argentina to 
reintroduce basic trade union and human rights. Callaghan suspended 
negotiations over a proposed lease-back arrangement on the grounds of 
excessive Argentine belligerency, and introduced a Latin-American 
refugee scheme, but continued to pennit arms sales to the regime. 
Diplomatic relations with Argentina remained frozen until Margaret 
Thatcher's victory at the 1979 general election. Rejecting the inevitability 
of post-imperial decline, Thatcher forcefully pledged to renew Britain's 
nuclear capability and revitalize British-American relations. She envisaged 
Britain as America's foremost partner in the cold war and had little interest 
in the Commonwealth, which "provided a stage for post-colonial posturing 
by nationalist leaders happy to squeeze as much aid as possible from 
Britain"?8 In Thatcher's eyes, the Conservative Party was leading a post-
colonial mission to destroy the preconditions for socialism on a national 
and global basis. If successful this mission would reverse British declin~. 
Her primary imperial concerns were reaching settlements over Rhodesta 
and Hong Kong.29 The Conservatives' Falklands' strategy was guided by_ 
America, which viewed the Junta as a bulwark against the spread of 
socialism in South America.30 
Thatcher's government accelerated arms sales to the Junta, removed 
the amnesty for political prisoners and restarted negotiations over 
sovereignty.31 the junior Foreign Office minister, Nicholas Ridley, a ~lo~e 
ally of Thatcher, favoured a leaseback arrangement, whereby Bntam 
would transfer sovereignty to Argentina while continuing to govern the 
Islands in the medium term. In 1981, the Nationality Act removed 
Falkland Islanders' rights to full British citizenship, further complicating 
the sovereignty question. That year, a Defence Review recommended the 
27 Labour History Archive and Study Centre (LHASC), Judith Hart Papers. ~art 
6/Jl, Argentina: The Trade Unions Fight On (London, British Argentma 
Camnaign, 1978). 
28 John ~Campbell, Margaret Thatcher, vol. 2: The Iron Lady (London: Jonathan 
Cape, 2003), 319. 
29 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: Harper Collins, 1995), 
71-.S. 259-62. 
30 M~dern Records Centre (MRC), University of Warwick, Trades Union Congress 
(TUC) Archive, International Department Files on Latin m1d South America 1981-
1982, MSS.292D/980/3. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(ICFTU) attributed the Junta's growing confidence to the right-wing Republican, 
Ronald Reagan's election as American President in November 1980. 
31 LHASC. Michael Foot Papers, MFIL19. Events Leading up to the Conflict. 
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withdrawal of the sole naval patrol ship HMS Endurance from the South 
Atlantic by the autumn of 1982. Richard Thornton contends that these 
actions were part of an elaborate "sting", devised by American President, 
Ronald Reagan, and Thatcher, to encourage an invasion of the Falklands, 
which could be used as a pre-text for military intervention to topple the 
Junta, which was close to developing a nuclear weapons capabllity.32 This 
would strengthen Thatcher's domestic standing, preserving New Right 
leadership on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Thornton's analysis, however, is questionable, as America possessed 
the economic leverage to undermine the Junta without resort to a proxy 
war. Furthermore, British military success was not guaranteed, and it was 
not in America's strategic cold war interests to destabilize its relations 
with South America. Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands on April 2, 
1982, facing minimal resistance. When parliament was recalled the 
following day, for its tirst Saturday sitting since the Suez Crisis, Thatcher, 
already beset by record post-war unemployment, unrest in the "inner-
cities" and the lowest poll ratings of any previous prime minister, was in 
an exposed position. Her decision to despatch a naval taskforce to u""le 
Soutl1 Atlantic, 8,000 miles from the United Kingdom, represented a huge 
military and political gamble. On the suri'ace, it appeared an ideal 
opportunity for the opposition to exploit. 
Speaking for Britain? Labour Party Strategies, 
April 3-21, 1982 
The Labour Party, however, had descended into bitter lefJright in-fighting 
following the 1979 general election defeat. The future ideological 
trajectory of the party was at the heart of debate. A left-wing grouping on 
the National Executive Committee (NEC), led by Benn, sought to transform 
Labour into a vehicle for radical economic and social change through NEC 
control of the election manifestos and mandatory reselection of MPs.33 In 
contrast, moderates and revisionists were intent on constructing a cross-
class coalition to resurrect the social democratic consensus. Following the 
establishtuent of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in March 1981 by 
senior "liberal revisionists", the Labour Party's status as the main 
32 Thornton, Falklands Sting, xvii-xxv. 
33 Leo Panitch and Colin Leys, The End of Parliamentary Socialism (London: 
Verso, 20tJl), 168-76. 
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opposition party appeared in jeopardy34 The SDP highlighted infiltration 
of the Labour Party by the Trotskyite Militant Tendency, presentmg 
Labour as infested with left-wing extremists. Militant encouraged social 
democrats and socially conservative CLP members to leave the Labour 
Party, exacerbating int~mal divislons.35 
Foreign policy was a central issue, with the debate over nuclear 
disarmament and EEC membership fanning symbolic fault-lines. The 
Bennite left promised a decisive break with the consensus on foreign 
policy, condemning American policy in Latin America as imperialist and 
!ending vociferous support to the Anti-Apartheid Movement.36 Foot, who 
had been elected as Labour Party leader in 1980, was suspicious of the 
Bennite left's 'anti-parliamentary tendencies', and focused on maintaining 
party unity, seeking to create an atmosphere of tolerance and trust. In 
pursuing this goal, however, Foot struck uncomfortable compromises with 
left-wing and moderate opponents, generating a sense of indecision and 
allowing internal divisions to fester. By April 1982, Foot's ability to lead 
d . 37 the party was un er scrutmy. . 
Foot adopted an unexpectedly belligerent stance over the Argenune 
invasion of the Falklands, unequivocally supponing the decision to send a 
naval taskforce to the South Atlantic?8 He asserted that Britain had a 
"moral duty, a political duty and every other kind of duty" to ensure that 
the .islanders' "association" with Britain was sustained.39 Barnett argues 
that Foot's rhetoric discredited fds internationalist credentials and exposed 
34 I vor Crewe and Anthony King, The Birth Life, and Death of the Social Democraric 
Partv (Oxford: Oxford U~iversity Press, 1997), 93~ John Golding, Hammer of the 
Left.: iJefeating Tony Benn, Eric Hejfer and Militant in the Battle for the Labour 
P~rty (London: Politico, 2003), 1 78-84: ~tephen Meredith, Labours Old and NeH·:,. 
The Parliamentary Right of the British Labour Party, 1970-79 and the Roots OJ 
New Labour (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008), 13-J 8. 
35 Diane Hayter, Fightback! The Labour Party's Traditional Right during the 
1970s and 1980s (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 28-31. 
36 Stephen Howe, "Labour and International Affairs", in Duncan Tanner, Pat 
Thane and Nick Tiratsoo. eds., Labour's First Century (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 143. 
37 In May 1982, National Union of General and Municipal Workers (GMWU)~ 
sponsored MPs discussed the possibility of removing Foot as party leader before 
the next general election. See Giles Radice, Diaries 1980-2001: From Political 
Disaster to Election Triumph (London: Orion, 2004), 70. 
38 LHASC, Labour Partv Archive (LPA), Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) 
Parliamentary Committee" (PC) Minutes, Apr. 3, 1982; Interview with Michael 
Foot on Dec. 12, 2007. 
39 Hansard Parliwnentary Debates (Apr. 3, 1982), coL 638. 
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him as a liberal imperialist.40 Yet Foot viewed the Junta's actions as 
unwarranted fascist aggression. He was convinced that challenging the 
Junta was in the international interest and contended that Argentine 
democratic socialists would welcome Britain's statement of intent. Foot 
envisaged Labour's primary role in the dispute as ensuring parliamentary 
scrutiny of the government in order to expose Thatcher's compliance in 
allowing the invasion to occur. With this objective in mind, Foot declined 
Thatcher's offer to share military inteiHgence with the party.41 Demanding 
a UN-brokered settlement, Foot's strategy rested on the principle of 
collective security. He hoped that the party would unite behind this dual-
track approach. 
The strategy, however, reflected the extent to which Foot was torn 
between two conflicting interpretations of the dispute. On the one hand, 
his co111Initment to anti-appeasement and democratic socialism led him to 
oppose ali fascist aggression, while on the other hand, Foot felt anxious 
over the paralleis with the Suez Crisis, which he had so forcefully 
condemned whilst editor of Tribune, 42 Labour's deputy leader and shadow 
foreign secretary Denis Healey was privately concerned by Foot's 
intervention, fearing that it would limit the party's room for manoeuvre,43 
He had been in Greece, and had not been contacted by Foot to clarify 
tactics. Healey drew direct parallels with the Suez Crisis, He was 
convinced that America would not allow British miiitary intervention in 
the Falklands to destabilize its relations with South America.44 
Nevertheless, Healey supported Foot's stance in order to maintain party 
unity. 
Within the shadow cabinet and NEC, Foot paradoxically relied upon 
the support of moderates and revisionists engaged in bitter anti-left 
conflict to provide him with a majority. Revisionists, such as the shadow 
home secretary Roy Hattersley, MP for Birmingham Sparkbrook. tended 
to believe that Britain was obliged to intervene to uphold democracy.45 
Giles Radice, MP for Chester-1e-Street, described the revisionists' 
watchwords as "no moral gestures, no mock heroics and no blank 
cheques".
46 
With the local elections Jooming, they were determined that 
the party avoid being_ perceived as unpatriotic or pacifist. The shadow 
40 Bamett, Iron Britannia, 32-3. 
41 LPA. PLP PC Minutes, Apr. 14, 1982. 
42 
Michael Foot Papers, MFIL19, scribbled notes on Falklands Crisis. 4
3- Denis Healey, The Time of My life (London: Penguin, 1990), 496. 
44 LPA, PLP PC Minutes, Apr. 14, 1982. 
45 LPA, PLP PC Minutes, Apr. 5, 1982. 
46 Radice, Diaries, 66. 
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chancellor Peter Shore, MP for Stepney, adopted a similar stance, whlle 
the shadow education secretary Neil Kinnock, MP for Bedwellty, then on 
the centre left of the party. supported the taskforce as a bargaining chip to 
achieve a diplomatic settlement.47 Moderates, such as John Golding, MP 
for Newcastle-under-Lyme, sought to appear in touch With w~rking-~lass 
sentiment by adopting a combative, anti-fascist interpretatio? of the 
dispute.48 In Golding's eyes, the Falklands debate represente~ ~nother 
shibboleth of the internal war against the Bennite left. Descnbmg the 
dispute as "a complex question about the remnants of empire", Benn 
contended that the "real interest there is the oil" and condemned the 
prospect of military conf1ict 49 Eric Heffer, ~he shadow minister for 
European and community affairs and MP for Liverpool Walton, was the 
only NEC member associated with the Benmte 1efl to devtate from 
outright opposition to the taskforce. . . . . 
The leadershio souoht to vindicate its stance by htghhghtmg official 
Labour Party poiicy, .:hich linked the transfer of sovereignty with the 
restoration of democracy in Argentina. In doing so, however, Foot found 
himself at odds with the Labour-supporting Daily Mirror and Labour 
Weekly which opposed sending the taskforce, arguing that "the blood that 
needs ~o be spilt is the blood of political reputations" -50 Indeed, the 
Socialist International Committee for Latin America, the Gen~ral 
Confederation of Labour of the Argentine Republic, and Argentine 
human-rights groups attacked the Labour Party's support for the taskfor~e, 
arguing that the campaign for democracy in Argentina ~as unrelated to tne 
Malvinas. 5 1 Meanwhile, by denouncing opponents ot the taskforc~. as 
"appeasers", Healey and the moderates unwittingly en~orsed the. position 
of New Right-influenced tabloids, such as the Sun, whtch were mrent ,?n 
using the crisis to popularize Thatcherism. The Sun as~er~ed that :;-
British citizen is either on his country's side - or he IS 1ts enemy , 
communicating the simple ~essage that ~ri~~in, "can still ... be 'Great''', to 
its predominantly workmg-c1ass readership. 
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Developments amongst Foot's traditional centre-left allies in the 
Tribune Group were crucial to the balance of opinion within the pany. At 
the previous year's party conference, a "soft left" Tribunite faction, led by 
Kinnock, had broken away from the Bennite left and aligned itself with the 
moderates and revisionists in defence of the party Ieadership.53 The 
Falklands dispute was the first serious challenge to the cohesion and 
purpose of the anti-Bennite, Tribunite "soft left". Despite scepticism over 
the despatch of the taskforce, the editor of Tribune, Dick Clements, gave 
the newspaper's approval to Foot's dual-track strategy.54 Within the 
Parliamentary Labour Party, however, there was substantial opposition 
towards sending the taskforce, centring on the belief that its presence in 
the South Atlantic would heighten the prospect of escalation to full-scale 
war with Argentina. 55 Given heightened cold war tensions, there was also 
concern that the Soviet Union would intervene, widening the conflict. 
Others condemned the prospect of islanders being caught in military 
crossfire, and feared retribution against British nationals in Argentina. 
Unlike Foot's dual-track strategy, opponents of the taskforce favoured lJN 
~na~cial and economic sanctions to exploit Argentina's dependence on 
tore1gn loans and emphasised that the UN should take full responsibility 
for orokermg a peaceful resolution to the dispute. The overwhelminu 
majority of CLP motions endorsed this interpretation of the disput;, 
pressing Foot to use the invasion to highlight the limited deterrent offered 
by nuclear weapons.56 
. Foot'~ tactics were reliant on America vetoing British military 
mter~entwn,. or the achievement of a diplomatic settlement, closely 
assoCiated With Labour Party policy, which could be used as a platform 
from which to expose the Conservatives' incompetent handling of the 
dispute. Reagai1, however, privately supported Britain, and th:e Junta was 
unwilling to engage in consrructive dialogue, playing into the hands of 
Thatcher, who hoped to use successful military action to revitalize her 
premiership. 
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Searching for Peace and Unity: The Outbreak of War 
and Internal Labour Party Dissension, April21 -
June 14, 1982 
Following the outbreak of hostilities in South Georgia on April 21, Foot 
and Healey became increasingly desperate to broker a UN settlement, as a 
tidal wave of media-generated jingoism swept Britain.57 However, by 
calling for a conditional ceasetire, dependent on Argentine withdrawal 
from the Islands, Foot confused his earlier belligerent rhetoric, creating a 
general sense of incoherence. The Labour Party also appeared impractical 
and unpatriotic to be insisting on a diplomatic settlement, entailing UN 
trusteeship of the Islands or shared sovereignty, when British forces were 
making advances. Christie argues that "the Labour leadership's hesitant 
and unconvincing support for the war exemplified the point that Labour 
has never managed to work out a consistent and distinctive view of 
Britain's place in the world".58 In contrast, Thatcher formed a war cabinet 
and deployed "Churchillian" rhetoric to emphasize the independent nature 
of Britain's actions, combining "resonances of Victorian 'gunboat 
diplomacy' [with] ... the popular experience and memory of the Second 
\Vorld War".59 Joe Ashton, the Tribunite h1P for Bassetlaw, sought to use 
his column in the Daily Star to puncture Thatcher's "furious flag-waving 
patriotism" by querying her World War Two service record, but the rest of 
the media would not carry the story60 
Friction now began to emerge amongst revisionists, moderates and the 
"soft left" over the islanders' right to self-determination, and the prospect 
of a full-scale British invasion. Hatrersley rejected the Falklanders' right to 
a "veto" over British defence and foreign policy, but the shadow health 
secretary Gwyneth Dunwoody, 1.1P for Crewe, and George Robertson, :MP 
for Hamilton, insisted that the islanders' wishes should be paramount. 61 
Kinnock opposed an invasion on the grounds that lt would sabotage 
diplomatic negotiations, while Healey, resigned to the loss of British 
sovereignty over the Falklands, insisted that a fuU-scale invasion was not 
feasible. In contrast, Shore argued that Britain was "morally in the right", 
and that Labour should not be seen as a "peace at any price party" .62 
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Although it was evident that the leadership's strategy was unravelling, the 
revisionist-moderate-"soft left" coalition on the NEC held, defeating a 
motion by Benn, urging immediate withdrawal of the taskforce, by fifteen 
votes to eight.63 
The TUC was vital in defending Foot's position. It issued a supportive 
press statement and secured international endorsement of Foot's strategy 
from the ICFTU and the Commonwealth Trades Ullion Congress.64 The 
TUC justified its stance on the basis of solidarity with the Falkland Islands 
General Employees' Union, which opposed a transfer of sovereignty to 
Argentina. In reality, its approach was shaped by moderate and "soft !elf' 
unions intent on maintaining Labour Party unity and marginalising the 
Benllite left. Indeed, moderate and "soft left" unions, such as the GMWU, 
National Union of Railwaymen (NUR) and Transport and General 
Workers' Union (TGWU), limited official discussion of the issue at their 
conferences to conceal the undercurrent of unrest amongst left-wing trade 
unionists. 65 Official opposition towards the taskforce was largely restricted 
to the "hard left" National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), Fire Brigades 
Union and National Union of Public Employees.66 
During this period, opponents of the conflict became more vocal. 
Judith Hart, Tribunite MP for South Lanark, established the cross-party Ad 
Hoc Corrunittee for Peace in the Falklands, which worked in tandem with 
Labour Action for Peace and the British Peace Assembly, campaigning for 
an unconditional ceasefire.67 The Committee was bolstered by the 
selection of a leading Bennite, Chris Mullin, as Tribune's new editor.68 
Under Mullin's stewardship Tribune became anti-war, printing a reworded 
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General Secretary's Report to Annual General Meeting, June 28, 1982. 
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version of Foot's famous 1956 headline "Stop This Suez Madness", which 
proclaimed "Stop This Falklands Madness".69 Mullin also published an 
onen letter by former Tribune journalist, Anthony Arblaster, entitled "Will 
The Real Michael Foot Stand Up?", which accused Foot of being "carried 
along by [the] tide of revived imperialist fervour". Foot responded by 
highlighting his desire for a UN-brokered settlement and condenmmg the 
. "'nf 'j 1 ft. .. 70 new regime's 1 ·anti e e Ism . 
Christie contends that, "it was precisely that section of the Left that 
had for vears been arguing ... for a principled foreign policy who were now 
arguing"' against the war on basical!y pra~matic ,grounds~'.71 H?wev~r, .. h~ 
fails to appreciate that these groupmgs vtewed tne co~fhct as ~penaus~: 
seekino- to revive jinaoistic, militaristic and racist sentiment, which woula 
c ' c •. ' . 
be exploited by the Conservative Party. Arguments ~~rroun?mg th~ a.n~-
fascist nature of the war were condemned as hypocntlcal, given Bntam s 
escalatin2 arms sales to the Junta, enlistment of Chilean fascist support, 
and the ""city of London's ongoing handling of Argentinean financial 
transactions. 72 
Pragmatic opposition, Jed by Tam Dalyell, the shadow science 
spokesman and centrist l\1P for West Lothian, focused on the ec~noilllC 
worthlessness of the Islands and the logistical difficulties surroundmg the 
military operation.73 Following the sinking of the Argentine cr~iser 
General Belgrano on 1\1.ay 2, Dalyell played an increasingly pr~mment 
role in opposing the war. Meanwhile, Benn proposed evacuatmg the 
Falklands and compensating the islanders for their losses on the grounds 
that it would create the preconditions for a UN settlement, and be more 
cost efficient than fighting a war.74 He contended that it was immoral to 
spend £4 billion on a war at a time of record post-war unemployment and 
widespread cuts in public services. The Scot!ish Trades Union Congress 
and the NUM supported this line of argument. '5 Following a parliamentary 
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debate on May 20, thirty-three Labour MPs voted against the war. In a 
vain effort to assert leadership authority, Foot sacked Dalyell and the 
shadow arts spokesman Andrew Faulds, MP for Warley from their 
frontbench positions on May 24. However, this only served to prompt the 
resignations of the shadow home affairs spokesman John Tilley, MP for 
Lambeth Central, and the shadow food, agriculture and fisheries 
spokesman Gavin Strang, MP for Edinburgh East.76 
The Militant Tendency attacked the Ad Hoc Committee for Peace in 
the Falklands as being detached from the confrontational reality of 
working-class life, concluding that Thatcher "would merely shrug her 
shoulders and laugh" at its pacifrst demands 77 Indeed, anti-war 
demonstrations tended to be confined to London, attracting crowds of 
2,000-10,000.78 Some protestors displayed banners proclaiming "Victory 
to the Argentine Junta", embellishing the media-generated perception that 
the labour movement was unpatriotic. 79 Kenneth 0. Morgan accurately 
surmizes that "the jingoism of wartime seldom helps a parry of the left". 80 
At the 1982 local elections, the Labour Party suffered a net loss of forty-
seven council seats.81 The "Falklands effect" was felt most heavily in 
southern England, London, and parts of the Midlands, which were integral 
to the electoral balance of power. The party made limited progress in 
northern England, reinforcing its grip on South Yorkshire, but failing to 
retake Liverpool, whilst suffering heavy losses in Leeds and Bradford. In 
[would] produce yet another round of closures as our share of the burden". See 
National Union of Mineworkers Annual Conference Report 1982 (London: NlJM, 
1982), 344-5. 
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Scotland, results were more encouraging, reflecting the less jingoistic 
Scottish response to the conflict. 82 
Foot's complex diplomatic argument, which contrasted sharply with 
Thatcher's populist jingoistic rhetoric, had limited appeal in an increasingly 
polarized wartime climate. The Labour Party's strat~gie~ ~e:e ~ui~t _upon 
the principle of collective security, and acceptance of Bntam·s d1nnmshed 
post-imperial status. By creating the perception that Britain could still 
operate as an independent international power, Thatcher's victory in the 
Falklands tapped a rich seam of dormant Anglo-British nationalism, which 
celebrated the United Kingdom's imperial past. Divided and bereft of a 
credible alternative, the Labour Party was unable to counter this upsurge in 
jingoism. The sole political beneficiary of the conflict was the 
·conservative Party, which iinked victory in the Falklands with Thatcher's 
efforts to overturn the post-war consensus and restore British 
"Greatness".83 Presenting the labour movement as an unpatriotic vested 
interest, inhibiting economic recovery and national unity, Thatcher 
harnessed the "Falklands Factor" to win a landslide victory at the 1983 
I . 84 general e ectiOn. 
A Lost Cause: The Labour Party's Falklands 
Campaign in Perspective 
The Falklands conllict oresented the Labour Party with a post-imperial 
foreign policy conund~um that neither the leadership nor ~ti-war 
opponents could solve. The reinstatement of democracy in Argentma was 
supported by the entire labour movement and British vi~tory in the 
Falklands helped to achieve this goal. However, the prevwus Labour 
government had armed the Junta and, during the conflict, fascist Chile 
assisted the British war effort, discrediting notions of an anti-fascist 
crusade. Indeed, arguments surrounding British sovereignty and the 
islanders' right to self-determination were complicated by the Falklands' 
control by a private company. Although anti-war campaigners' interpretation 
82 Jimmy Allison, Guilty by Suspicion: A Life and Labour (Glendaruel: Argyll, 
1995), 95. 99. 
83 Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, 235. 
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Factor. .. We have ceased to be a nation in retreat. Vie have instead a newfound 
confidence born in the economic battles at home and tested and found true 8,000 miles 
away." 
190 The Labour Party and the Falklands Vt.'ar 
of the conflict, which drew on the Labour Party's belief in its historic anti-
imperialism, corresponded with CLP and Argentine socialist opinion, their 
acceptance of short-term Argentine control of the Falklands risked 
strengthening the Junta, which was persecuting fellow socialists and trade 
unionists. Furthermore, anti-war opponents were out of touch with 
working-class and public opinion, which overwhelminoly approved of 
Thatcher's action. Viewed through the prism of jinooistic emedia coverao-e 
. . - e e ' 
VIctory m the Falklands rendered Benn's contention that Britain was the 
"last colony in the British Empire" imolausible. 
John Golding's deluded assertion fuat the conflict "probably saved the 
Labour Party", by discrediting Bcnn and undermining support for the 
SDP, is tes~ament to the depth of feeling generated by internal 
factionalism. 8) Although the revisionist-moderate-"soft left" alliance on 
the NEC remained intact, laying the preconditions for the 
Kinnock!Hatters!ey "dream ticket" leadership,86 the war weakened the 
popular appeal of the Labour Party. Waning support for the SDP-Liberal 
Party alliance was at best of marginal benefit to Labour, which became 
increasingly debilitated as the conflict progressed. Existing divisions were 
deepened, new internal wounds int1icted, and the party's public imao-e 
further tarnished. Foot's dual-track strategy could only succeed ;t a 
diplomatic agreement was reached or the taskforce was defeated or 
~uffer~~ heavy_ casualties, leaving the Labour Party leadership ill-prepared 
lOr Bnlish Il'jhtary advances. After hostilities commenced, they appeared 
impractical and incoherent, continuing to support the taskforce, while 
arguing in favour of a ceasefire and UN trusteeship of the Falklands when 
British troops were successfully fighting to recover the Islands. 
Foot's strategy also took insufficient account of the media's role in 
~resenting Labour Party policy. The overwhelmingly hostile media gave 
tne party leadership little credit for supporting the taskforce whilst 
castigating Foot for proposing a negotiated settlement. Indeed: in the 
public consciousness, extensive media coverage of Labour Party 
opponents of the war led the party to become associated with pacifism and 
appear unpatriotic, sabotagiilg Foot's delicate political balancing act. To 
compound matters, Foot found himself at odds with the pro-LaboUI nress 
and his CND support base, further weakening his leadership authoritY and 
accentuating internal divisions. In effect, British military success in the 
F~klands left the Labour Party in a no-win situation, galvanizino-
Tnatcher' s post-imperial mission to destrov socialism c 
" . 
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